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Abstract. In this paper I  explore humility as a  paradigm, with reference to 
recent debates over the morality and rationality of emotions, and to the relation 
between religion and emotion. In Ancient Greek ethics, humility did not 
yet play a  role; with the rise of Christianity, however, it becomes one of the 
cardinal virtues – only to disappear again with the onset of modernity. Against 
a culture-pessimistic interpretation of this development, this article begins by 
characterising the relation between virtue and emotion, before reconstructing 
the inner rationality of humility and showing how it can be traced through 
several transformations to a  modern ethics of responsibility. Against this 
background, possible manifestations of the humble attitude in the present are 
made plausible.
I. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE MORALITY OF FEELINGS
Recently, the debate about emotions has grown to such an extent that 
an  overview has become difficult. It covers not only different areas of 
philosophy, but also neuro-, social and cultural sciences.1 However, the 
so-called emotional turn already took place in the last two decades of the 
20th century. Since the turn of the millennium, the number of publications 
about the topic has also significantly increased in continental Europe. 
Predecessors of this debate in the Anglo-Saxon language area reach 
back even further. Those beginnings – such as Anthony Kenny’s 1963 
1 The publication database of the Freie Universität Berlin’s interdisciplinary research 
cluster ‘Languages of Emotion’ provides a good overview, available at: <http://www.loe.
fu-berlin.de/zentrum/publikationen/datenbank/index.html> [accessed 19/07/2014].
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study Action, Emotion and Will2 – and the further course of the debate 
show that moral questions are a  central motif for the re-evaluation 
of emotions. But the new approach to emotions was not supposed to 
merely be a revival of traditional views within sentimentalism, such as 
Adam Smith’s and David Hume’s moral sense philosophy. The point is 
rather nothing less than a  ‘fundamentally new approach to construing 
normative-ethical theories’.3
The reason why a simple return to the classics of sentimentalism has 
been impossible, even for analytical philosophers, is the long shadow of 
Kant’s ethics. The fact is often overlooked, although it was critical for the 
formation of his practical philosophy, that Kant himself had sympathies 
for sentimentalism in the time prior to his critiques. Intense consideration 
of Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense led him to the well thought-out belief 
that objective and universal norms could never be justified by reference 
to moral feelings.4 Only after this discussion did Kant uncompromisingly 
turn towards justifying ethics by pure and practical reason. According to 
this tradition, norms or the ethical quality of actions can only be justified 
by reference to distinctly rational reasons.5 Of course, Kant’s conception 
of reason was often modified and expanded in modernity. Nevertheless, 
modern ethical discourse is determined by the rational justification 
of good reasons. Theological contributions to current socio-political 
questions also rarely refer directly to their religious traditions, but rather 
defend those rational arguments whose conformity with those traditions 
one hopes to show.
The reference to justifying reasons, however, notoriously leaves 
a problem unanswered: knowing the good reasons for a certain choice 
of action does not at all mean that – to use Kant’s terminology – this 
knowledge could also determine our will. In modern ethics this is also 
called the problem of motivation in deontology. How can justifying 
reasons also, as factual motives, determine a  possible action’s agent? 
2 Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994) (Reprint 
of the 1963 Edition).
3 Sabine A. Döring, ‘Die Moralität der Gefühle. Eine Art Einleitung’, in Die Moralität 
der Gefühle, ed. by Döring / Verena Mayer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 15–35 
(p. 15).
4 Cf. Dieter Henrich, ‘Hutcheson und Kant’, in Kant-Studien, 49 (1957/58), 49–69.
5 For the classical debate about the status of reasons, cf. Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, 
Reasons and Causes’, in The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963), 685–700; Georg Henrik 
von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).
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This problem has not only led to an often anti-Kantian renaissance of 
virtue ethics,6 but also to a renewed interest in the emotions. The precise 
advantage of classical sentimentalism, with its justification of moral 
actions, was that it also provided a veritable motivation to act. However, 
if this advantage is to be saved against rationalistic objections of Kantian 
provenance, a  new conception of emotions is necessary. The basic 
thesis of recent theories of emotions is therefore: emotions are not the 
irrational awareness of subjective states – as many classical theories of 
emotions have suggested, that are now subsumed under the label theories 
of feelings. Instead, emotions have their own form of rationality. The latter 
is characterized by intentionality and representationality. Emotions are 
not only directed towards objects, but they also represent or evaluate 
them in a certain way.
According to this roughly cognitivist conception, emotions are 
comparable to perceptions or evaluations. Consequently, the recent 
debate about emotions also leaves room for discussing the epistemic 
status and the meaning of values.7 The advantage with respect to the 
aforementioned moral dilemma is that we can now attribute a form of 
rationality or intelligence to motivational emotions – even an emotionally 
caused weakness of will. This basically means that, given a certain object 
or situation, emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate. If we could 
also state criteria for appropriateness, emotional evaluations could 
indeed be acknowledged as rational reasons for actions. In this sense, 
emotions would be good reasons and, at the same time, strong motives.
In the re-evaluation of the role of emotions in human life that took 
place in neuro sciences, philosophy and cultural studies, one area has 
been mostly neglected. Since the question whether there are qualitatively 
specific religious feelings at all is controversial, this area can be described 
more carefully as follows: it concerns the relationship between religion 
and feelings. It should be uncontroversial that we can refer to religion 
here, since religion is a centuries-old culture of feelings and expressions 
that are reflected in the doctrine of affections and social teaching. In 
what follows, I therefore want to investigate this relationship by means of 
the example of humility. In a first step, I will justify why humility seems 
to me to be a suitable example.
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981).
7 Cf. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. by Peter Goldie (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 475–613.
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II. THE VARIED HISTORY OF HUMILITY
For this purpose, I want to employ a narrative that can often be encountered 
in relation to the concept of humility, although historical research is, with 
good reasons, working on polishing some of its edges. According to this 
well-known narrative, humility marks an important break in the history 
of Western ethics. In a slight exaggeration, we might say that humility 
is still unknown in Greek ethics. In antiquity, the lexemes tapeinos/
tapeinophrosune that were then continued, by mediation of the Latin 
humilis/humilitas, as the English term humility, were used as negative 
predicates. However, with the rapid rise of Christianity in the ancient 
world, humility quickly became the epitome of morality.8 Humility 
cannot be found next to justice, bravery, moderation and wisdom in pre-
Christian catalogues of virtues. In Aristotle’s Poetics, he warns us that our 
verbal expressions should be clear, but by no means tapeinos, i.e. ignoble 
or commonplace.9 With Origen, by contrast, humility has already risen 
to be one of the cardinal virtues. It is even praised as the fundamental 
virtue from which all other virtues stem. Parallel to this development of 
humility into a cardinal virtue, it also turns, as it were, into the epitome 
of the Christian conduct of life. The focal point for this is the monastic 
form of life, the class of the perfected ones, in whose growing regulation 
humility is structured into steps of inner and outer self-humiliating 
asceticism – from a submissive poise to the absolute obedience towards 
even obvious caprice of the superior. In this epoch, Augustine summed 
up his deep theology of humility and, at the same time, reshaped it into 
a theology of grace.10
If we follow this narrative, we have to talk about a  radical 
transvaluation of values with respect to the impact of Christianity on the 
ancient world. Bad style and a despised low moral and social rank turned 
8 Cf. a classic and a more recent study about the topic: Albrecht Dihle, ‘Demut’, in 
Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des 
Christentums mit der antiken Welt, ed. by Theodor Klauser, vol. III (Stuttgart: Anton 
Hiersemann, 1957), pp.  735–778; Ekkehard Mühlenberg, Altchristliche Lebensführung 
zwischen Bibel und Tugendlehre. Ethik bei den griechischen Philosophen und den frühen 
Christen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).
9 Aristotle, The Poetics, transl. by W. Hamilton Fyfe (Cambridge Mass.: Havard 
University Press, 1965), pp.  84–85 (1458a.22). For the catalogue of classical ancient 
virtues, cf. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, transl. by H. Rachkham (Cambridge Mass.: 
Havard University Press, 1968), Book II– V.
10 Cf. A. Dihle, loc.cit. (note 8), pp. 755–773.
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into a moral ideal that even exceeded the aristocratic virtues of bravery 
and wisdom. A schematizing exaggeration of this kind will, however, not 
survive historical criticism – for the reason alone that this development 
took place under the conditions of a great cultural synthesis in which the 
self-understanding of the Jewish-Christian tradition was shaped in the 
medium of Greek thinking and the society of late antiquity. If we take 
this into account, we can also find many historical continuities besides 
the discontinuity that I have just described. From a systemic perspective, 
however, I have decided to ignore those details. One reason for this is 
that there is another important aspect concerning this great historical 
development, and it is at least as astonishing as the boom of humility in 
the Christian West. Given the significance of humility for the identity of 
a Christian culture it is hard to imagine that Christian ethics could also 
do without the concept of humility. But this is exactly what happened. 
A look at the ethical theories of German Protestantism can illustrate this 
surprising fact. Wolfgang Trillhaas, Martin Honecker, Trutz Rendtorff, 
Eilert Herms, Dietz Lange or, more recently, Wilfried Härle – humility 
can usually not even be found in the index of their works, and there is 
no systematically relevant role for humility.11 How can this be explained?
I  think there are two main reasons. The first was already hinted at 
in the denominational characterization of this fact  – catholic moral 
doctrine is much less obvious in this respect. First, one can see an after-
effect of Luther’s highly ambivalent relationship towards humility here, 
it seems. The notion of humility can originally be found in the context of 
his new concept of faith, which developed out of late medieval penitential 
theology. Humility represents the religious self-realization of the sinner. 
But as the epitome of the monastic form of life, it is increasingly affected 
by this criticism of legalism. In his Magnificat interpretation, Luther 
castigates the virtue – which exhibits itself in gestures and prepares for 
11 Wolfgang Trillhaas, Ethik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970); Martin Honecker, Einführung 
in die Theologische Ethik. Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 
1990); Trutz Rendtorff, Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer 
ethischen Theologie, 2 volumes (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990/91); Eilert Herms, 
Gesellschaft gestalten. Beiträge zur evangelischen Sozialethik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991); 
Dietz Lange, Ethik in evangelischer Perspektive (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2002); Wilfried Härle, Ethik (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2011). Also in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Emotion, ed. by John Corrigan (Oxford / New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), humility plays no role. A recent exception is Robert C. Roberts, 
Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues (Michigan / Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
2007), pp. 78–93.
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receiving grace – as a ‘wrong’, ‘made’ humility, even as a ‘secret pride’. Its 
contrast is the true humility of Mary, which is no ascetic self-humiliation, 
but an inner ‘inclination towards lesser things’, as Luther puts it. With 
his criticism of humility, Luther thus represents a radical aggravation of 
an ethical-religious dialectic of the Christian cardinal virtue. I will come 
back to this later. Due to his criticism of virtues, Luther returns to the 
literal use of language and does not translate that the Lord has seen the 
humility of his maiden, but: ‘he has seen the nothingness of his maiden’.12
Of course, Luther’s ambivalent relationship with humility was not 
the sole reason for the complete end of this tradition. It was probably 
decisive that humility increasingly became synonymous with a menial 
attitude and blind obedience towards authorities. Humility thus became 
incompatible with the self-understanding of modern human beings. 
A well-known proof for this transvaluation can be found in David Hume. 
In his A Treatise on Human Nature, he argues that, against the tradition 
of the ‘schools and pulpit’, one should consider humility not as a virtue, 
but as a  vice.13 The result of this development is then confirmed by, 
e.g., Paul Tillich, who, in his Systematic Theology, almost casually states 
that there is an  opposition between the humility and the dignity and 
freedom of human beings.14 Nobody has contributed more to humility’s 
loss of prestige and the thorough alienation towards the former prime 
Christian virtue than Friedrich Nietzsche. He turned an unease that had 
been accumulating for a long time into a provocative aggravation with 
a vigorous effect. For his biting criticism of Christianity, the ‘dangerous 
and defamatory ideal’ of humility is paradigmatic: Christianity has turned 
‘timid baseness’ into virtuous humility by ‘lies’. For Nietzsche, it is almost 
the epitome of an  ethics of resentment and ‘herd morality’ by which 
Christianity has suppressed the self-affirmation and self-enhancement 
of life for far too long.15
12 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7 (Weimar 1897), p. 559: ‘er 
hat angeshen die nichtickeyt seyner magt’.
13 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Sect. VII.
14 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1951), p. 288.
15 Cf., e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. by Carol 
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 27. Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885–1887. Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 12, ed. by Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin/New York: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag / De 
Gruyter, 1988), pp. 108ff.
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III. RATIONALIZING HUMILITY
For now, this sketch of the history of the concept has to suffice as 
a background for systematic considerations. I will address some detailed 
aspects of the problem later. This varied history of the rapid rise of 
humility in antiquity and its loss of prestige in modernity could suggest 
regarding it as a prime example of the often mourned ‘loss of virtue’.16 
For the ‘malaise of modernity’ is mostly due to a ‘self ’17 that is entirely 
thrown back to itself and hence – as one could extend the schema – to 
a self that lacks the object of any humility, because it lacks any religious-
metaphysical frame of reference. In what follows, I would like to resist that 
temptation and suggest a different interpretation of the state of affairs. In 
this, I can at least partially follow Dietrich Rössler. In contrast to the so-
called mainstream, he has at least reflected on the fate of humility, to be 
more precise: in the context of a discussion of the thesis about the ‘loss 
of virtue’.18 Rössler convincingly shows that the claim of such a decline 
cannot be proven historically, and it also contradicts the innermost 
nature of morality. Morality is necessarily bound to the changing 
historical-cultural conditions. So it is almost ethically demanded that 
certain virtues vanish over the course of time, and new virtues develop. 
Of course, a third possibility is conceivable and can also be observed, i.e. 
that virtues survive various epochs, but their inner meanings change. 
Rössler does not think that humility is a virtue of this type, but regards it 
as bound to the conditions of life in the middle ages and not compatible 
with modernity. This is exactly the point where I would like to object 
and develop a different interpretation. For this purpose, I will address 
the question of the ‘rationality of emotion’ that has been discussed in the 
more recent debate, and present a slightly different view.
Given the historical background, it is recommendable for a further 
characterization of humility to start with the question of the relationship 
between virtue and emotion.19 According to the Aristotelian tradition, 
virtues are basic attitudes that are developed by education and habituation 
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, loc.cit. (note 6). 
17 Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Havard University Press, 1989), and The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, Ontario: Anansi 
Press 1992).
18 Dietrich Rössler, Akzeptierte Abhängigkeit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Ethik, ed. by F. 
Voigt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp. 16–35.
19 Cf. Verena Mayer, ‘Tugend und Gefühl’, in Sabine Döring / Mayer (eds.), Die 
Moralität der Gefühle (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 125–149.
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and that dispose us in a certain way. Virtues can indeed have an emotional 
basis, or, as Aristotle says: refer to the pathe, the passions, even though this 
is not necessary. One example would be the dianoetic virtue of wisdom. 
If feelings are involved, however, virtue requires a  certain distance 
towards the passions – not necessarily in the sense of the stoic ideal of 
emotionlessness (apatheia), but in the sense of an  integration of basic 
emotions through reason. In accordance with the current philosophical 
interest, Aristotle does attribute a necessary function to emotions, seen 
as part of our capacity to aspire, for our motivation to act. At the same 
time, attitudes or dispositions are no simple emotions like fear, joy or 
anger, but also necessarily contain cognitive and conative aspects besides 
the emotive factors. If we understand humility, in a virtue ethical sense, 
as a basic attitude or disposition of this kind, it is not so much a simple 
emotion, but rather a certain attitude towards emotions.
Primarily in cultural sciences, but also philosophy, it has been pointed 
out that complex emotions, but even more so emotional dispositions, 
are not anthropological constants. They are rather determined by 
cultural factors. Verbalizations, symbols, narrative patterns and social 
forms of behaviour already determine the way we emotionally interpret 
certain experiences. This applies even more to the attitudes that are 
then acquired.20 So if we want to identify the alleged rationality of 
such attitudes, we should first take the formative cultural patterns and 
interpretations into account. Humility is a  particularly good piece 
of evidence for cultural relativity – and not only because of its varied 
history leading up to its vanishing in the present, but especially in its 
historical beginnings.
Wilhelm Hermann, the last protestant ethicist who was seriously 
interested in humility, has most notably defended the view that we can 
only understand the original sense of the humble attitude if we look at 
Jesus’ humility.21 Jesus as the paragon of humility – humility as imitatio 
Christi – this is in fact a motif that is a common thread in the confusing 
multitude of Western theology of humility. With reference to early 
Christianity, the New Testament Scholar Ulrich Luz already talked about 
20 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Cf. also Goldie’s premise of the narrative structure of the emotions: Peter Goldie, The 
Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 4ff.
21 Wilhelm Herrmann, ‘Art. Demut’, in Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie 
und Kirche, vol. 4 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1898), pp.  571–576; cf. 
Herrmann, Ethik, 5th edition, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1913), pp. 224–230.
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an  ‘ethical Christology or Christological ethics’ in his commentary to 
the classical section in Matt. 11:29.22 The person of Jesus – prefigured by 
motifs from Jewish tradition – is hence the cultural framework in which 
the sense of the humble attitude becomes intensified. The self-surrender 
to the divine will and thus – according to the double commandment of 
love – to the neighbour, culminating in the humiliating crucifixion, is 
understood as the expression of highest, divine dignity. In the personal 
unity of this contrast lies the original rationality of humility. Notably 
Augustine has contributed to its final conceptualization: ‘Do you wish 
to lay hold of the loftiness of God? First catch hold of God’s lowliness.’23 
The logic of humility results in the interpretation of the concrete figure 
of Jesus. At the same time, a feature can be seen in the inner dialectics 
of loftiness and lowliness that will not only be continued in the tradition 
of humility, but will count as a feature of religious feelings and attitudes 
in general.24
When the eschatological expectations of Early Christianity are left 
behind and the challenge of a Christian conduct of life within the ancient 
world arises, humility becomes subject to a second wave of rationalisation. 
Roughly speaking, from the Early Christian roots an understanding of 
humility in terms of penitential theology develops first. Here humility 
entirely becomes a matter of religious self-assessment and is understood 
as contriteness in the face of one’s own sinfulness and lack of rights 
against God and the neighbour. At the same time, the outer practice 
of self-humiliating asceticism arises, which attains a  methodological 
22 This refers to: ‘... learn from me; for I  am meek and lowly in heart.’ Cf. Ulrich 
Lutz, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus (EKK I/2) (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger Verlgag/
Neukirchener Verlag, 2007), p. 224.
23 Augustinus, ‘Sermo 117’, in Sancti Aurelii Augustini, Hipponensis Episcopi, 
Opera Omnia, tom. 5 (PL 38 / Migne) (Paris 1861), pp. 661–671 (p. 671): ‘Vis capere 
celsitudinem Dei? Cape prius humilitatem Dei.’
24 Cf., e.g., Howard Wettstein, ‘Awe and the Religious Life: A Naturalistic Perspective’, 
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXI (1997), 257–280 (pp. 260ff.). Wettstein explicitly 
uses the term humility and talks about a  ‘duality  – humbled yet elevated [...] duality 
that seems very close to the bone of the religious orientation encouraged by so much 
of Jewish religious life (p. 261). Cf. also, e.g., Georg Simmel, Gesammelte Schriften zur 
Religionssozioloige, ed. by H. J. Helle (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), pp.  38, 40, 
53, 55 et al. For Rudolf Otto’s theory of religious feelings, for which this structure will 
also be systematically relevant, cf. Roderich Barth, ‘Religion und Gefühl. Schleiermacher, 
Otto und die aktuelle Emotionsdebatte’, in Religion und Gefühl. Praktisch-theologische 
Perspektiven einer Theorie der Emotionen, ed. by L. Charbonnier, M. Mader and B. Weyel 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 15–48.
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character in monastic rules. In the debate about this penitential theology 
that can, for example, already be seen in Celsus, a transformation takes 
place that acknowledges humility in the doctrine of virtues of Greek 
thinking. For this development, which comprises a distinction between 
right and wrong forms of humility, the contrast with pride is decisive. 
Classical Greek literature could already explain the tragic complications 
of life by a  hubris against the gods.25 Greek ethics also knew virtues 
such as modesty, unpretentiousness or the Aristotelian concept of 
mesotes. But still the aristocratic ethics of the ancient world regarded 
megalopsychia – which can be translated as magnanimity or pride – as 
one of its finest virtues.26 This conceptual field is the background for the 
further rationalisation and establishment of humility. Now it is simply 
equated with Socratic modesty or even stoic apathy and thus separated 
from the pure resignation into one’s sinfulness. Subsequently, humility 
rises to a  religiously re-interpreted megalopsychia or mangnanimitas, 
in the sense of striving for the truly good and becoming God-like. By 
contrast, pride turns into a feeling of self-worth that is merely based on 
social status and ethical achievements and hence the fundamental vice 
of the superbia. It even becomes the epitome of sin. From now on, pride 
and humility form a contrast. The latter, as the basic virtue, has to justify 
the moral-religious quality of any behaviour. Augustine merges the 
virtue ethical and penitential theological interpretation into a theology 
of grace and deepens it. His concise formulation of this transvaluation 
of the logic of passions is: ‘There is [...] something in humility which [...] 
exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it.’27
This second, although many-voiced and heterogeneous, rationalisa-
tion of humility obviously means a  significant change from the 
original notion of a humble attitude that was personified in Jesus. The 
understanding of humility as an attitude of realizing oneself and one’s 
sins was presupposed in all of these conceptions. It is not compatible 
with the humility of Jesus, even if the monastic self-humiliation tries to 
return to the worldlessness of Early Christianity – in contrast to a virtue 
ethical arrangement with the world. The ideal of Christ’s humility 
becomes a saving deed of God that is unachievable for human beings, 
25 Cf. Paul Ricœur, Philosophie de la volonté 2. Finitude et culpabilité (livre II. La 
symbolique du mal) (Paris: Aubier 1988), p. 355–373.
26 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (loc. Cit. Note 19), Book IV (1123a34–1125a35).
27 Augustine, City of God (De civitate dei), Book 11–22, transl. by Philip Schaff.
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but it facilitates the elevation of the humble person. At the same time, the 
quote from Augustine also shows that humility in its opposition to pride 
should not exclusively be understood as a  feeling of suppression, but 
rather as an alternative, i.e. a religiously mediated form of self-respect. 
The recurring dialectic of loftiness and lowliness indicates an  at least 
formal continuity to the interpretation of Jesus’ humility.
A  third rationalisation of the conception of humility takes place in 
modern ethics. This specifically modern interpretation of humility is 
related to the question: what could be the reason for human self-respect? 
And it is separated from the theology of mercy, although not necessarily 
from a religious context. Since the beginnings of this debate, the moral 
use of human freedom has been identified as the justification of pride 
and self-respect in a positive sense. The value and dignity of a human 
being are due to her ability to responsibly determine herself. This is 
a  broad consensus within modern ethics. By now, Christian ethics 
beyond denominational borders has mostly agreed with this consensus. 
But the modern conceptions of human dignity are accompanied by 
the insight that this is primarily a determination of human beings, and 
the factual realization of freedom can merely approximate it. The use 
of freedom by finite individuals in their particular contexts is factually 
lagging behind its ideal and is hence deeply ambiguous. For this reason, 
quite different modern ethicists have been led from the opposition of 
pride and humility to the description of the concrete conscious shape of 
responsible freedom. At the same time, they distinguish – in the sense 
of the criticism of humility from Celsus to Luther – between a virtuous 
and a vicious or bootlicking humility. For instance, Descartes’ generosité, 
Kant’s respect for the moral law or Hartmann’s moral pride explicitly 
include a virtuous or moral humility.28 Humility, correctly understood, 
therefore does not at all contradict the modern awareness of freedom, 
but is rather reconstructed as its necessary prerequisite.
28 René Descartes, Les Passions de L’ame, art. 149–159; Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics 
of Morals; Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962), p. 477: ‘True pride and 
true humility apparently belong together out of necessity, they demand each other, can 
only exist in synthesis.’ Even David Hume, loc. Cit. (note 13), who does not reformulate 
a positive concept of humility, maintains the dialectic of loftiness and lowliness in the 
mixed feeling of respect/contempt. However, humility exclusively means the aspect 
of suppression for him. He also maintains the distinction between a  positive and 
a problematic form of pride. For Kant’s feeling of respect/awe, cf. Birgit Recki, ‘Kant on 
Religious Feeling’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3(2014), pp. 85-99.
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Let me sum up the three stages of rationalisation again: in the 
interpretation of the person of Jesus, the notion of devotion to the divine 
will and fellow beings which makes us forget our care for our own lives, 
gains a  dignified sense. In a  varied further development, humility is 
turned into the self-assessment of the sinner and contrasted with pride as 
the true, i.e. religiously justified, form of self-respect. This understanding 
of humility is continued by the modern discourse about freedom and 
integrated as factual aspects into the awareness of human autonomy as 
moral humility. It is interesting from the perspective of the history of 
culture that a structural complementarity can be seen between ethical-
religious ideas of biblical religion and the basic insights of modern ethics 
of reason, across several steps of transformations and interpretations. 
This exposition of the basic logic(s) of humility, however, leaves the 
question of a contemporary form of humility open.
IV. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE HUMBLE ATTITUDE
In the clarification of the relationship between virtue and feeling, I have 
called humility an  inner attitude. As dispositions for certain ways of 
behaving, such basic attitudes are usually unconscious or, at most, only 
partially conscious. They only emerge from their latency in contexts and 
situations and actualize their innate tendencies in individual experiences 
and actions. As singular interpretations, such concretisations are of 
course structurally distinct from the underlying reservoir of senses 
and are necessarily a  restriction of the possibilities contained within. 
Inner attitudes are, vice versa, the result of deposits of a  multitude of 
cognitive, affective and conative implementations of the biographical 
history of one’s education. If the reconstruction of the inner rationality 
of the humble attitude I  have presented in the preceding section is 
correct, two features can be identified as necessary requirements. First, 
a  relation to unconditionality is essential to this attitude. This can be 
seen in its reformulation in the context of modern models of moral self-
determination. In terms of the example chosen above: Descartes talks 
about the similarity of freedom to God, Kant about the sublimity of the 
moral law and Hartmann about the perfection of the moral ideal and 
the inexorability of its demands. The dimension of unconditionality is 
thus relocated into human morality and does not necessarily require 
a religious explication. At the same time, this dimension of sense shows 
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a basic affinity and openness towards religious interpretations, as it can 
be seen ideally in Jesus’ devotion to the divine will or in the religious-
ethical orientation by Christ’s perfect humility.
The second feature of the humble attitude is a unity in tension that 
results from this relation to unconditionality. It can be seen in the 
dialectics of loftiness and lowliness, the polarity of sin and mercy, the 
inner ambiguity of pride and suppression or the difference between 
determination and facticity. Formally, this feature could be summed 
up as the contrasting harmony of participation and withdrawal or 
immanence and transcendence. The humble attitude is, as it were, fixed 
in this dynamic opposition. If we now assume that an inner attitude that 
possesses these features can also be habitualized in the present – also since 
not only traditional religious, but modern interpretative schemata are 
available for this – this assumption can be made plausible by presenting 
potential manifestations of the humble attitude.
I  previously noted that virtues usually refer to our emotional life 
or can even be regarded as specific attitudes or dispositions towards 
emotions. The ideal of a, to a great extent, independence from the passions 
represented by stoic calmness is an extreme and well-known case. Not 
least because it was regarded as a basic attitude, this ideal was – as we have 
seen – identified with the humble attitude in Christian antiquity. Robert 
C. Roberts has recently suggested an interpretation of this kind.29 It seems 
to me, however, that this interpretation does not do justice to the inner 
tension of humility. If we are looking for the structural parallels with 
the inner unity in tension, a possible emotional expression of humility 
could rather be the positive, not at all humble feeling of gratitude. Just 
like the self-relativization in the face of something higher – in which it 
also participates – is typical for humility, gratitude contains knowledge 
about the incommensurability in relation to the gift it responds to.30 With 
gratitude, I also refer to something that is, in a sense, unattainable for me 
and thus limiting me. But it is also bestowed upon me and elevates me.
29 Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions (see above, note 11), p. 88: ‘Humility is not 
itself an emotion [...]. But humility is an emotion-disposition – primarily a negative one, 
a disposition not to feel the emotions associated with caring a lot about one’s status. [...] 
it is the absence of a spiritually cannibalistic appetite. Humility is cannibal-anorexia, as 
we might say.’
30 Cf. Georg Simmel, ‘Soziologie’, in Simmel, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 11, ed. by O. 
Ramstedt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 661–670, especially pp. 667f.
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The systematic distinction between the level of the inner attitude on 
the one hand and the episodic single feelings on the other hand also allows 
for understanding the humble attitude as an  integral that comprises 
negative emotional aspects, but is not exhausted by them. Even the 
negative sense of the concept of humility, i.e. lowliness, even humiliation, 
can be integrated this way without spoiling the positive overall sense. 
Such feelings of distress or being in over one’s head can arise given a great 
responsibility whose dimension points to the possibility of not being able 
to cope. A positive experience such as success can also trigger a feeling of 
humility understood this way – a, as it were, curbed enthusiasm given the 
knowledge that this success was not only due to my own achievement, 
but that it also entails the failure of others. And of course such feelings 
arise in the context of the awareness of one’s guilt, i.e. if the structural 
dimension of this guilt is taken into account and exceeds the capacity 
of our personal responsibility. In religious self-assessment, the principal 
dimension of such feelings is reflected and they can turn, sub specie 
aeternitatis, into feelings of one’s own worthlessness or voidness. If the 
humble attitude was restricted to such negative aspects, it could indeed 
be accused of leading to resignation. However, as, e.g., Max Scheler has 
pointed out in his phenomenology of humility, such experiences are in 
fact compatible with natural pride. Hence they are distinct from menial 
servitude.31 And also from a religious point of view, the native aspects 
are countered by a  positive telos, i.e. being accepted by the heavenly 
father. Roberts characterizes humility, understood in a Christian sense, 
as a ‘transcendent form of self-confidence’. Transcendence is meant here 
as the overcoming of mundane value standards.32
However, the humble attitude can never wholly manifest itself in 
episodic single feelings. As the epitome of a  totality of the ideas and 
emotions synthesized in it, this pre-conscious attitude can, if at all, 
only be represented in emotional consciousness as moods. These 
forms of emotional life are considered to be a  marginal case by most 
cognitivistically oriented research on the emotions, and are explored by 
Heidegger and others after him in the 20th century. They are characterized 
by their intentional indeterminacy and can comprise single experiences 
that are individualized by their intentions or accompany them with their 
31 Max Scheler, ‘Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend (1913)’, in Scheler, Gesammelte 
Werke, vol. 3 (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1995), pp. 13–31 (pp. 17ff.).
32 Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions (see above note 11), p. 81.
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specific undertone.33 The German word for humility, Demut, suggests 
that humility is not only a pre-conscious attitude or an episodic single 
feeling, but can also manifest itself as a mood. If we try to describe the 
mood of humility phenomenally, one can distinguish it from exalted 
pride by describing it as a  lowered mood with a trace of sincerity that 
might stem from having overcome a  sadness. But at the same time, it 
should not be confused with a rueful-frightened timidity.
The fact that a  positive description is difficult could have a  reason 
that makes me come back to Luther’s critique of humility.34 One of 
his basic claims is that true humility does not know that it is humble 
or – as he says metaphorically – that it cannot see itself. For if it were 
directed at an awareness of itself – and this is Luther’s clever argument – 
a performative self-contradiction would arise: In the moment of its self-
assertion, humility would no longer be selfless devotion. If we continue 
this thought, the adequate manifestation of a  humble attitude that is 
oriented at the perfect humility of Christ or simply moral autonomy 
would not so much be the emotional tensions accompanying it or 
a contemplative mood, but rather an engagement with, or losing oneself 
in, concrete responsibility. Only in this sense would humility also be 
an  ethical and not just a  religious attitude. It still necessarily implies 
a relation to oneself, but such that its expressions are not a self-feeling. It 
would be, in Harnack’s profound formulation, an inner attitude that ‘has 
found its centre outside of itself ’.35
We must not forget one final expression of humility. Feelings and 
attitudes are usually bound to a  correlative bodily behaviour  – this is 
a  consensus in almost all theories of emotions. Regardless of how 
this correlation is described, facial expressions and gestures reveal 
a  counterpart to inner life. Humility also has its correlating gestures, 
although they are not safe from false attitudes and strategic abuse. One 
example of an  appropriate gesture of humility, perhaps especially due 
to its unconventionality, would be chancellor Willy Brand’s Warsaw 
Genuflection. At the time, it was highly controversial in Germany, but 
it has become entrenched in our collective memory. Recently, Navid 
33 Cf. the classic essay by Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995). For the newer debate, see, e.g., Peter Goldie, 
The Emotions (see above note 19), pp. 141–160.
34 See above, note 12.
35 Adolf von Harnack, ‘“Sanftmut, Huld und Demut” in der alten Kirche’, in Festgabe 
für Julius Kaftan zu seinem 70. Geburtstage (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 113–129 (p. 123).
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Kermani in his speech at the celebration of the German Basic Law’s 
65th anniversary mentioned the strange paradox that a state regained its 
dignity by an act of humility.36 The fact that this comment was made by 
a critic of the theology of the Cross has a particular secular payoff given 
the origin of the humility tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent debate about the morality of emotions has managed to free 
emotions and consequently attitudes towards emotions like humility 
from the ghetto of irrational and therefore ethically questionable states. 
This correction allows for an adequate description of the personal identity 
of moral agents. Taking the connection between religion and emotion 
into account directs our attention towards complex emotions and 
attitudes, their layered and hermeneutic character and their shapeability 
by cultural symbols and institutions. The rationality of the emotional is 
also more appreciated in this broader sense than would be possible in the 
distinction between reasons and causes.
There is not necessarily a  contradiction between humility and the 
modern human self-understanding  – which might be regarded as the 
reason why humility has disappeared from modern ethical theories and 
debates. Following reformatory traditions, but also modern discourse 
about freedom, it can rather be shown that humility in the sense of 
an inner attitude can be regarded as the virtue-ethical basis of a culture 
of responsibility. For it is the ideal of an  inner attitude that not only 
affectively internalizes the transgression of particular interests, but also 
the ambiguities connected with it. This conception of humility is not 
intended as a religious solution to the so-called problem of motivation, 
but as a non-resignating way of dealing with its facticity. From a culture-
hermeneutical view, the ethical practice of free, democratic societies 
can – against all cultural pessimism – be seen as an expression of true 
humility. It is a humility that, following Luther’s conception, does not 
become a  talking point, but is manifested in the concrete living out 
of individual and institutional responsibility. As a  distance towards 
one’s own positionality, it also embodies the ability to make political 
compromises and also to accept them.
36 Available at: <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/-/280688> 
[accessed 19/07/2014].
